We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement "-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of "-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.
Introduction
Fix a mechanism design environment where each agent has a "payo¤ type" and agents' payo¤s from di¤erent allocations depend on the pro…le of payo¤ types. If we come up with a mechanism where, whatever the agents'beliefs and higher order beliefs, there is an equilibrium where outcomes are consistent with a social choice correspondence, we say that that the mechanism robustly implements the social choice correspondence.
If we restrict attention to "direct mechanisms" where agents truthfully report their payo¤ types but not their beliefs, a social choice correspondence can be robustly implemented only if it can be implemented in ex-post equilibrium. 1 Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that this equivalence between robust mechanism design and ex-post mechanism design continues to hold for some environments and social choice correspondences, even if mechanisms eliciting and using beliefs are allowed. In particular, this is true in a quasi-linear environment when there is a unique acceptable social allocation as a function of the payo¤ types, but transfers can depend on beliefs and are not restricted by budget balance.
In many contexts this observation is negative since ex-post incentive compatibility can be very restrictive. Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame (2006) show that in a generic class of multi-dimensional quasi-linear environments, only trivial allocation functions can be expost implemented. This implies a disturbing discontinuity. In a one-dimensional single-crossing environment, e¢ cient allocations are implementable in ex-post equilibrium and thus robustly.
But if the single-crossing environment is embedded in a larger, multi-dimensional payo¤ type environment where single-crossing is perturbed generically, only trivial allocation functions are ex-post implementable.
Here, we show that this negative result and the discontinuity around single-crossing are properties of ex-post implementation, but not properties of robust implementation. When we allow the entire social choice to depend on beliefs, and consider implementation of social choice correspondences in rationalizable strategies, continuity is restored and "-e¢ cient allocation correspondences are robustly implementable in all close-by environments. More precisely, Theorem 1 shows that if a mechanism M fully implements an optimal social choice function in a one-dimensional, supermodular, baseline environment, then M also fully implements an almost optimal social choice correspondence whenever agents have approximate common knowledge that the baseline environment is close in a sense we make precise. This observation highlights that robust implementation is more ‡exible than ex-post implementation in economically important environments. The intuition for the result is that rationalizable strategies vary continuously in underlying payo¤s, so if agents have strict incentives to report truthfully in the baseline environment, then reports can be only slightly o¤ in a perturbed environment. . The resulting allocation depends on beliefs and is generally not e¢ cient but the welfare loss is less than ". Thus the social choice correspondence consisting of "-e¢ cient allocations is robustly implementable. 2 In this paper, we generalize the logic of the example by considering as baseline a class of payo¤ environments from Bergemann and Morris (2009), where payo¤s are interdependent and not necessarily quasi-linear, but satisfy a supermodularity condition and a contraction property that limits the interdependence. Theorem 1 shows that if a direct mechanism implements an optimal social choice function in a baseline environment, then the same mechanism implements the social choice correspondence of almost optimal outcomes in any close-by environment.
Literature
Examples in Bergemann and Morris (2005) illustrate the point that robust implementation could occur when ex-post implementation was impossible, using mechanisms that elicited and responded to beliefs. By showing here that close to optimal SCCs are robustly implementable, we highlight the economic signi…cance of this point. Börgers (1991) and Smith (2010) show in a general social choice setting, and a public good setting with private values, how mechanisms that elicit and respond to beliefs can robustly improve on ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms. 3 A subtle di¤erence to our result is that these papers show that any ex-post mechanism is outperformed by some robust mechanism for some beliefs, while our paper shows that there is a social choice correspondence that is robustly implementable but not ex-post implementable.
Our result that belief-dependent robust mechanisms may improve on ex-post mechanisms contrasts with work by Chung and Ely (2007) who show that an ex-post mechanism is the optimal robust mechanism for revenue maximization in a class of single-object allocation settings with quasi-linear payo¤s.
Setup
Basics: There is a …nite set of agents, i = 1;
; I, and an outcome space X with associated
; M I ; g) is given by message sets M i and an outcome function g : M ! Y .
Types:
We represents agents' beliefs and preferences, and higher order beliefs and preferences, with a type space T = (T i ; i ; e u i )
, where each agent i has a set of types T i , a measurable function describing the agent's beliefs about others' types, i : T i ! (T i ), and a bounded Bernoulli utility function on outcomes and types e u i : X T ! [u; u]. This utility function extends to lotteries in the standard expected utility way. We put no restrictions on the agents' beliefs and preferences, so this type space can be understood as the universal type space of Harsanyi (1967/68) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) over all possible bounded expected utility functions.
Interim Rationalizability: We ask when the planner can design a mechanism such that rational strategies of the agents lead to acceptable outcomes for the planner. We will use the solution concept of interim (correlated) rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007)). An agent can send any message that survives iterated deletion of messages that are not best-responses to any beliefs that are consistent with i and put probability one on message-type pro…les that have not yet been deleted. Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) argue that interim rationalizable messages are those that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality among the agents. By a standard duality argument, a message is interim rationalizable if and only if it survives iterated deletion of messages that are interim strictly dominated. A formal description of the set of interim rationalizable messages e R M i (t i ) for type t i of agent i playing mechanism M is as follows:
The outcomes acceptable to the planner are represented by a social choice correspondence (SCC)
This de…nition does not require existence of rationalizable messages. We argue in section 4 that this does not matter for the interpretation of Theorem 1. To ensure existence of rationalizable messages we would need to assume compactness of type spaces T i and message spaces M i , as well as continuity of utility functions e u i , belief functions i , and the outcome function g of the mechanism.
Approximate Optimality: We will be particularly interested in approximately optimal SCCs. Label a planner as agent 0 with utility e u 0 :
If the planner maximizes the sum of the agents'utilities, so e u 0 (y; ) = X e u i (y; ), and in addition the environment is quasi-linear, then SCC F is -optimal if and only if allocations are -e¢ cient.
The purpose of the paper is to give new su¢ cient conditions for the implementation of approximately optimal SCCs.
Baseline Payo¤ Type Environments
Our su¢ cient condition relies on approximate common knowledge that payo¤s are close to those generated by a payo¤ type environment that satis…es special properties. A payo¤ type environment does not specify agents' beliefs and higher order beliefs: we will be allowing them to have any beliefs and higher order beliefs. The special properties strengthen those in Bergemann and Morris (2009).
We …rst describe the notion of closeness capturing approximate common knowledge of a payo¤ type environment. Then we describe an alternative solution concept de…ned directly on the payo¤ type environment that constrains behavior of types close to the payo¤ of environment. Then we report the special properties of the payo¤ type environment that we use in our positive results.
Approximate Common Knowledge
The payo¤ type environment ( ; u) = ( i )
is given by compact payo¤ type spaces i for agents i = 1; ::; I and continuous Bernoulli utility functions u i : Y ! R for i = 0; 1; ::; I.
We say that the payo¤ environment ( ; u) is -approximate common knowledge at type pro…le
T with t 2 E and a mapping to payo¤ types e i : E i ! i such that 1. Baseline payo¤s and true payo¤s are -close on E:
u j (y; e (t)) e u j (y; t) 8j; y 2 Y; t 2 E 2. The event E is common (1 )-belief among agents:
This de…nition allows for two perturbations of the payo¤ environment. Condition (1) allows payo¤s to be misspeci…ed by up to at every type pro…le. Outside the set E payo¤s can be completely misspeci…ed, but condition (2) requires the set E to be (1 )-belief closed. For an illustration, if T is the universal type space over with perturbed utilities ju j (y; ) e u j (y; )j , then the payo¤ environment ( ; u) is -approximate common knowledge on all of T .
Payo¤ Environment Solution Concept
Instead of applying the solution concept of De…nition 1 directly, we connect it to an approximate version of rationalizability de…ned directly on the payo¤ environment ( ; u). For each payo¤ type i of each agent i, we iteratively delete messages that are not within of a best response for any belief over other agents'remaining payo¤ types and messages. Formally, we set
and say that message m i is -rationalizable for payo¤ type
If message m i is interim rationalizable for a type t i and the payo¤ type environment ( ; u) is approximate common knowledge at t i , then m i is -rationalizable for the corresponding payo¤
Lemma 1 Fix a payo¤ environment ( ; u) and a mechanism M = (M 1 ; ; M I ; g ( )). For any > 0 there exists > 0, such that whenever ( ; u) is -approximate knowledge at t = (t i ; t i ), then any interim rationalizable message m i of type t i is also -rationalizable for the payo¤ type e i (t i ). Formally,
Proof. In the Appendix.
This result is a consequence of the upper hemicontinuity of interim rationalizable outcomes As a corollary of this Lemma we have:
Corollary 1 For any > 0 there exists > 0, such that mechanism M implements SCC F at type pro…le t 2 T whenever 1. Payo¤ environment ( ; u) is -approximate common knowledge at t, and 2. m 2 R M; ( e (t)) ) g (m) 2 F (t).
One-Dimensional, Contractive, Supermodular Payo¤ Type Environments
We now introduce the restrictions on the payo¤ type environment that our main result appeals to. Recall that each i is a compact subset of R and that payo¤ functions u i (y; ) ; u 0 (y; ) are continuous in . We will consider slightly stronger assumptions than those in Bergemann and
Morris (2009).
A1 Assumption -Monotone Aggregator
The type pro…le a¤ects payo¤s u i via (across-agents) aggregators h i : ! R, so that
The aggregator h i is continuous, and strictly increasing in i , and payo¤s v i : Y R ! R are continuous in aggregated types.
A2 Assumption -Supermodularity
There is an order i on Y such that the payo¤ function v i (y; ) is weakly supermodular.
A3 Assumption -Contraction Property
There exists a strictly increasing function CP : R + ! R + , such that for all > 0, and all
, there exists i, and i ;
We will also consider a uniform version of ex-post incentive compatibility. Social choice function f : ! Y is uniformly ex-post incentive compatible, if there exists a strictly increasing function IC : R + ! R + , such that for all i; i 6 = 0 i and i the payo¤ loss when type i reports 0 i in the direct revelation mechanism f : ! Y is bounded below by IC :
Instead of justifying these assumptions directly we show that they are satis…ed in the following two examples from Bergemann and Morris (2009), and assert that they are also satis…ed in the further examples "Binary Allocation" and "Information Aggregation" in that paper.
Single-object allocation: Quasi-linear utilities with valuations v i ( ) = i + X j6 =i j , and < 1= (I 1) satisfy assumptions A1-3. Writing b i for the report of agent i in the direct mechanism, the generalized Vickrey mechanism allocates to i 2 arg max j f b j g and charges the winner
Truthtelling is ex-post incentive compatible and gives rise to an e¢ cient allocation. To render this mechanism uniformly ex-post incentive compatible, it is played with probability 1 ", while with probability " b i =I the object is allocated to i for a payment of
b j , and with probability "(1 X j b j ) the object is not allocated. 
Main Result
Theorem 1 Assume that ( ; u) satis…es (A1-3), mechanism M = ( 1 ; ; N ; f ) is uniformly ex-post incentive compatible, and the social choice function f is -optimal at every . Fix " > 0.
Then there exists > 0, such that M robustly implements a social choice correspondence F that is ( + ")-optimal at any type pro…le t with -approximate common knowledge of the payo¤ environment ( ; u).
In the introductory auction example the mechanism that performs well in the perturbed environment is just the second-price auction. Similarly here, the ( + ")-optimal mechanism M does not depend on the perturbed true environment as its de…niton is solely based on the payo¤ type environment ( ; u).
We emphasize that the mechanism M that is ( + ")-optimal on close-by type t is the same mechanism that is -optimal on the payo¤ type environment ( ; u). If mechanism M was designed explicitly for type t, Theorem 1 would be subject to the critique that one can robustly implement any SCC by designing a mechanism in which rationalizable messages do not exist.
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. Lemma 2 shows that rationalizable reports of t i must be Applying the contraction property to = R M; , there exists i, i and
The aggregator h i is uniformly continuous, so we can choose 2 (0; ) with 
This payo¤-loss is weakly greater for type i and any true type of others i Proof of Theorem 1. We …rst show that there exists > 0 such that every -rationalizable reports 0 of types leads to ( + "=2)-optimal outcomes in the payo¤ environment. For any " > 0, 
proving that outcome f 0 is ( + "=2)-optimal for types in the payo¤ environment.
To …nish the proof, choose < "=4 such that every rationalizable messages 0 of types t 2 E are -rationalizable for the -close payo¤ types = e (t). Then e u 0 (y; t) e u 0 f 0 ; t u 0 (y; ) u 0 f 0 ; + "=2 + "
…nishing the proof.
Discussion
We have reported su¢ cient conditions for implementing almost optimal social choice correspondences. Theorem 1 implies that for a …xed type space and an open set of quasi-linear payo¤ functions, "-e¢ cient social choice correspondences are robustly implementable.
To what extent can these su¢ cient conditions be weakened? Bergemann and Morris (2009) showed that without the contraction property (A3), it is impossible to fully implement exactly e¢ cient outcomes in any direct or indirect mechanism. One might conjecture that it would be impossible to fully robustly implement almost e¢ cient outcomes when there is approximate common For any mechanism M and any equilibrium of M on the universal type space over , there is one allocation x 2 f0; 1g that will be reached for all payo¤ type pro…les ( R ; C ). Any robustly implementable SCC is thus trivial in the sense that it allows the allocation to be constant. Such allocations can equally be implemented by a trivial mechanism that decides on the allocation without consulting the agents.
The argument that a ex-post implementable allocation function must be trivial is simple:
Rowena does not know whether her type u values allocation x = 1 higher than d; that depends on Colin's type C . Ex-post incentive compatibility implies a monotonicity condition on implementable allocation functions that is only satis…ed by trivial allocation functions in this example.
The argument that robustly implementable allocation correspondences must be trivial as well is more complicated and given in the appendix. It also relies on the property that the order over Rowena's types R depends on Rowena's belief R , and similarly for Colin.
The contrast with the introductory auction example is instructive: There, the order of types depends on beliefs only for types with close-by private value components. However, type i = (1; 1) is unambiguously higher than type i = (0; 0). This partial order ensures that non-trivial, and even "-e¢ cient, allocation correspondences are robustly implementable.
[ 
We now de…ne a belief i 2 (M i i ) that rationalizes message m i for type i = e i (t i ). Let i (m i ; i ) be the image of the measure e i (restricted to E i ) under the mapping e i :
j;k 1 ( j ) by the induction hypothesis.
Secondly, for all m 0 As t i 2 E i it must be that e i (M i ; E i ) = i (E i ) 1 , and so m i is a (2 + (u u) = (1 ))-best reply to the assessment i . This establishes m i 2 e R M; i;k e i (t i ) .
Proof of concluding Example. Fix a mechanism and an equilibrium of the mechanism on the universal type space over that implement an allocation correspondence A : ! f0; 1g.
The incentive constraints imply a monotonicity condition for every …rst-order belief R = ( R (`) ; R (r)) ; C = ( C (u) ; C (d)), namely that there exists a function a : ! f0; 1g with
Without loss of generality we now assume A (u;`) = f1g and will show that 1 2 A ( ) for all , so the allocation correspondence A is trivial. To do so we rule out three cases: Both of these terms are weakly negative, so both have to be zero, so a (u; r) = 1 and a (d; r) = 0. and so a (u; r) = 1. But if Rowena believes R (r) > 1=2, then (Mon-R) implies that a (u; r) = 0, contradiction.
